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# UK GREEN BOND MARKET DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIC LESSONS FOR VIET NAM

***Abstract:*** *Viet Nam's pursuit of rapid and sustainable development, including an average GDP growth target of at least 10% in 2026-2030, requires long-term capital that does not lock the economy into high-emission assets. This article analyses the United Kingdom's green bond market development and tests the practical transferability of its institutional lessons to Viet Nam through document review, process tracing and structured comparative analysis covering 2015-2026. It proposes an original Benchmark-Integrity-Liquidity-Internationalisation (BILI) framework and a weakest-link diagnostic for market quality. The results show that the UK's main achievement is not issuance volume alone but the sequence linking sovereign benchmark issuance, allocation and impact reporting, market-conduct rules and integration with a global financial centre, while its decision not to proceed with a national taxonomy also demonstrates the importance of proportionality and interoperability. For Viet Nam, the article recommends a phased sovereign green bond programme, enforceable verification and reporting, local-currency market deepening, and a unified green-finance architecture connecting the International Financial*

*Centre in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang with the national goals for 2030 and 2045.*

**Keywords:** *green bonds; sustainable finance; United Kingdom; Viet Nam; sovereign bonds; international financial centre; BILI framework.*

## 1. Introduction

Viet Nam is entering a development stage in which the quantity of capital remains important, but the quality, maturity and strategic direction of capital become decisive. The Resolution of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Viet Nam sets the objective of rapid and sustainable development, an average annual GDP growth rate of at least 10% during 2026-2030 [1], and a new growth model driven by science, technology, innovation, digital transformation, green transition and energy transition. It also links the 2030 objective of becoming a developing country with modern industry and upper-middle income to the 2045 vision of becoming a developed, high-income country [1]. The National Green Growth Strategy for 2021-2030, with a vision to 2050 [2], provides the environmental and structural direction for this transformation. Green finance is therefore not a peripheral environmental policy; it is part of the financial architecture required to raise productivity, modernise infrastructure and protect macroeconomic resilience.

The scale of the financing challenge is substantial. The World Bank estimates that a resilient and net-zero development pathway could require cumulative investment of about USD 368 billion through 2040, equivalent to roughly 6.8% of GDP per year [3]. The estimate includes around USD 254 billion for resilience and USD 114 billion for decarbonisation, and is explicitly presented as an order-of-magnitude assessment rather than a precise forecast [3]. This distinction matters: Viet Nam does not simply need more debt; it needs financial instruments that allocate savings toward bankable projects, extend maturities, distribute risks appropriately and preserve public-debt and foreign-exchange sustainability.

Green bonds can perform part of this function. Under the Green Bond Principles of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) [4], a green bond is a bond whose proceeds, or an equivalent amount, are applied exclusively to eligible green projects and whose issuance follows four core components: use of proceeds, project evaluation and selection, management of proceeds, and reporting. A green label is therefore a bond-level commitment concerning the use and governance of funds; it is not proof that the issuer as a whole is environmentally sustainable. This analytical distinction is central to preventing greenwashing and to designing regulation that rewards measurable environmental outcomes rather than marketing claims.

The academic literature supports a conditional, rather than automatic, view of green-bond effectiveness. Firm-level evidence finds that certified and first-time green bond issues can send credible signals and are associated with stronger environmental performance and investor response [5]. Cross-country evidence on sovereign green bonds indicates that a sovereign debut may catalyse corporate sustainable issuance, improve verification and disclosure practices, and support liquidity when it is embedded in credible climate policy [6]. At the same time, developing countries face high verification costs, limited project pipelines, shallow secondary markets and weak institutional capacity [7]. Research on Viet Nam identifies the regulatory framework, issuance guidance, incentives, international alignment, investor confidence and issuer capacity among the most binding barriers [8].

The United Kingdom is a relevant comparator because it combines a large sovereign bond market, London-based financial and professional services, an explicit green-finance strategy and a sovereign Green Gilt programme. The value of the case, however, lies less in copying a mature financial centre than in identifying institutional sequencing: which public actions create a benchmark, which integrity mechanisms reduce information asymmetry, and which market arrangements convert a labelled bond into a repeatable financing channel. The UK experience is also instructive because it includes policy correction. In 2025 the government decided not to proceed with a UK green taxonomy, showing that more classification is not necessarily better when proportionality, usability and interoperability are weak.

Against this background, the article asks: which elements of the UK green-bond development model are transferable to Viet Nam, in what sequence, and under what macro-financial safeguards? It pursues three objectives. First, it reconstructs the UK's institutional path and distinguishes market-building functions from country-specific features. Second, it develops a Benchmark-Integrity-Liquidity-Internationalisation (BILI) framework to diagnose the weakest link in a green-bond market. Third, it proposes a phased application for Viet Nam that connects sovereign and corporate issuance with the International Financial Centre in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang, the double-digit growth ambition to 2030, and the high-income vision to 2045.

**2. Materials and Methods**

The study uses a qualitative comparative case-study design. Its empirical material consists of 22 sources selected according to four criteria: authority, direct relevance to green-bond market design, recency, and verifiability. The corpus combines peer-reviewed research, official UK and Vietnamese policy documents, sovereign financing and allocation reports, market data from AsianBondsOnline, and bilateral declarations. The observation period is 2015-2026, allowing the analysis to cover the UK's transition from strategic preparation to repeated sovereign issuance and Viet Nam's movement from general environmental legislation to an operational green-classification framework and an international financial-centre regime.

The analysis proceeded in four steps. First, process tracing was used to reconstruct the sequence of UK policy measures and identify the economic function of each measure. Second, content analysis mapped the evidence onto four market-building pillars. Benchmark (B) refers to a sovereign or other high-quality reference instrument and a repeatable yield curve. Integrity ($I_g$) covers eligibility criteria, project selection, proceeds tracking, allocation and impact reporting, external review and enforcement against misleading claims. Liquidity (L) captures issuance regularity, tenor diversity, secondary-market tradability, investor breadth and intermediary capacity. Internationalisation ($I_n$) refers to compatibility with global standards, cross-border capital access, professional services and international cooperation.

Third, the two markets were assessed on an ordinal scale: 0 = absent; 1 = initial or pilot; 2 = operational but incomplete; and 3 = institutionalised. To avoid compensating a severe weakness in one pillar with strength in another, the article applies the diagnostic $Q_{BILI} = \min(B, I_g, L, I_n)$. This is a governance heuristic, not an econometric estimator. Its purpose is to discipline policy reasoning: a market cannot be considered high quality if it has sophisticated labels but no liquidity, repeated issuance but weak verification, or international listings without a domestic project and investor base.

Finally, the comparative findings were translated into policy design through a feasibility filter that distinguishes immediate measures, measures requiring prior institutional capacity, and long-term market-deepening measures. Triangulation across legal documents, allocation data and academic evidence reduces reliance on any single source. The study does not claim causal identification of a greenium or environmental additionality, and it does not use issuer-level microdata. Future research should test the BILI framework with transaction-level pricing, post-issuance impact data and surveys of Vietnamese issuers and institutional investors.

## 3. Results

### 3.1. Green bonds as a capital-allocation institution

The first result is conceptual: a green-bond market should be evaluated as an institution for capital allocation, not as a count of labelled securities. The Benchmark pillar reduces coordination costs by providing a transparent reference for pricing, duration and investor mandates. A sovereign green bond can be particularly influential because it combines high credit quality with a public commitment to disclosure; empirical research shows that this signal can crowd in corporate sustainable debt when the surrounding climate-policy framework is credible [6]. The benchmark function is strongest when issuance is repeated across maturities and integrated into ordinary debt management, rather than treated as a one-off symbolic transaction.

The Integrity pillar transforms a general environmental claim into an auditable financing contract. ICMA's four components [4] establish the minimum process, but credible market development also requires technical screening, avoidance of double counting, baseline data, annual allocation and impact reporting, and independent review. Integrity must be assessed at two levels. Bond-level integrity asks whether proceeds reach eligible projects and whether reported outcomes are methodologically sound. Issuer-level transition credibility asks whether the financed projects are consistent with the issuer's wider strategy and do not prolong carbon lock-in. Conflating these levels either overstates what a green bond proves or unfairly excludes transition projects that are economically necessary and environmentally material.

Liquidity and Internationalisation determine whether integrity can scale. Liquidity lowers exit costs, supports price discovery and enables institutional investors to manage duration and risk. Internationalisation widens the investor base and imports specialised services, but it can also create foreign-currency mismatch and regulatory fragmentation. The BILI framework therefore implies state-market complementarity: the state supplies credible rules, a sovereign benchmark and public data, while private issuers, investors, reviewers, underwriters and market makers convert those public goods into market depth. No single pillar is sufficient, which is why the minimum operator in Q_BILI is more appropriate than an average score.

### 3.2. Institutional sequence and outcomes in the United Kingdom

The UK case reveals a clear institutional sequence (table 1). The Green Finance Strategy, first issued in 2019 and updated in 2023 [9], positioned sustainable finance within financial-sector competitiveness, private-capital mobilisation and financial stability. The 2021 Green Financing Framework and the sovereign programme then converted strategic intent into an investable benchmark. The updated framework published in November 2025 [10] aligns with the ICMA principles, contains seven eligible expenditure categories, provides for annual allocation and impact reporting, and received an external second-party opinion.

Table 1. Institutional sequence of UK green-bond market development

| Period | Institutional measure | Market-building function | Evidence-based implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019; updated 2023 | Green Finance Strategy | Strategic direction | Links private-capital mobilisation, financial stability and financial-services competitiveness. |
| 2021 | Green Financing Framework and programme launch | Benchmark and integrity | Creates eligible expenditure rules, proceeds governance and sovereign reference instruments. |
| 2024 | FCA anti-greenwashing rule | Market conduct | Makes sustainability claims subject to fair, clear and non-misleading communication standards. |
| 2025 | Updated Green Financing Framework | Reporting and external review | Seven eligible categories, annual allocation and impact reporting, ICMA alignment and second-party opinion. |
| 2025 | Green Taxonomy consultation response | Policy proportionality | Government does not proceed; highlights use-case, burden and interoperability constraints. |

| Period | Institutional measure | Market-building function | Evidence-based implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Third Green Gilt 2037 | Yield-curve extension | GBP 6.25 billion new line; cumulative green gilt issuance reaches GBP 55.8 billion. |

*Source: compiled by the authors from [9-14].*

Sovereign issuance is the central Benchmark result. On 10 March 2026, the UK Debt Management Office launched GBP 6.25 billion of the 4 5/8% Green Gilt 2037, the third green gilt and the first new green line since October 2021 [11]. The transaction brought cumulative green gilt issuance since programme inception to GBP 55.8 billion [11]. More important than the nominal amount is the programme logic: a new maturity extends the green reference curve and regular debt-management operations make the instrument part of the sovereign market's normal architecture. This provides investors and corporate issuers with a credible reference asset rather than an isolated environmental product.

The allocation mechanism demonstrates the Integrity pillar. The 2024 allocation report states that the programme allocated a net GBP 11.9 billion to eligible expenditure in the reporting year [12]. Table 2 presents the detailed FY2023/24 allocation of GBP 11.851 billion. Clean transportation received the largest share, followed by cross-category programmes, renewable energy and climate adaptation. The structure shows that a sovereign green-bond programme can finance both mitigation and resilience; for Viet Nam, where climate vulnerability and energy transition are simultaneous priorities, this balance is strategically relevant.

Table 2. Allocation of UK green-financing proceeds in FY2023/24

| Eligible expenditure category | GBP million | Share (%) | Strategic interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clean transportation | 4,108.44 | 34.67 | Large-scale decarbonisation of mobility and network infrastructure. |
| Cross-category programmes | 2,956.79 | 24.95 | Programmes producing benefits across more than one eligible category. |

| Eligible expenditure category | GBP million | Share (%) | Strategic interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Renewable energy | 1,630.72 | 13.76 | Supply-side decarbonisation and energy-system transformation. |
| Climate-change adaptation | 1,393.69 | 11.76 | Resilience against physical climate risks and future fiscal losses. |
| Living and natural resources | 992.82 | 8.38 | Nature, land-use and ecosystem outcomes with long time horizons. |
| Energy efficiency | 720.30 | 6.08 | Demand reduction and lower operating costs across buildings and assets. |
| Pollution prevention and control | 47.83 | 0.40 | Targeted control of waste and pollution externalities. |
| Total | 11,850.59 | 100.00 | FY2023/24 allocation; percentages may differ from source totals because of rounding conventions. |

*Source: compiled by the authors from the UK Government Green Financing Allocation Report 2024 [12].*

The UK's integrity architecture extends beyond the sovereign framework. The Financial Conduct Authority's anti-greenwashing guidance, published in April 2024 and applicable from 31 May 2024 [13], requires sustainability-related claims by authorised firms to be fair, clear and not misleading. This is economically significant because disclosure quality is not merely an ethical issue: it affects information asymmetry, due-diligence costs and the risk premium demanded by investors. The UK approach therefore combines product-level reporting with market-conduct supervision.

The taxonomy episode provides a second, less obvious result. After receiving 150 responses, of which 45% were positive and 55% mixed or negative, the UK Government concluded in July 2025 that work on a national green taxonomy should not proceed [14]. The consultation found limited evidence that a distinct taxonomy would channel capital or reduce greenwashing proportionately, and stressed that classification does not itself change project risk, scalability or viability [14]. The lesson is not that taxonomies are unnecessary. It is that a taxonomy must have a defined use case, interoperable data and manageable compliance costs; otherwise it can become a reporting layer disconnected from investment decisions.

Applying the BILI scale, the UK scores 3 on Benchmark, 2 on Integrity, 3 on Liquidity and 3 on Internationalisation, giving Q_BILI = 2. The binding constraint is not the absence of instruments but the continuing challenge of converting process compliance into comparable environmental outcomes and issuer-level transition credibility. This diagnosis tempers a volume-centred interpretation of success and identifies the elements that Viet Nam should adapt rather than copy mechanically.

**3.3. Viet Nam's market position through the BILI framework**

Viet Nam has established important legal foundations. The Law on Environmental Protection No. 72/2020/QH14 [15] created the statutory basis for environmental classification and green finance; Decree No. 08/2022/ND-CP [16] detailed implementation and the treatment of green bonds; and Decision No. 21/2025/QD-TTg [17] introduced environmental criteria and procedures for confirming investment projects under the green classification list. Together, these instruments move the market from general policy encouragement toward a rules-based eligibility system. Their economic value, however, depends on technical guidance, consistent verification, data availability and enforcement.

Market depth remains limited. At the end of 2025, Viet Nam had USD 1.1 billion of sustainable bonds outstanding, only 0.15% of the emerging East Asian total, and the market was entirely private-sector driven [18]. Green bonds represented 52.2% and sustainability bonds 47.8% of the stock. About 80% of outstanding instruments had tenors of three years or less, producing a size-weighted average tenor of 1.9 years; nearly 55% were denominated in US dollars and 45% in Vietnamese dong [18]. These figures reveal three structural mismatches: market size is small relative to investment needs, maturities are short relative to infrastructure assets, and foreign-currency exposure is high for a transition that must ultimately be financed mainly from domestic income and savings.

Investor concentration compounds the problem. Insurance companies held 61.6% and banks 37.4% of local-currency government bonds at the end of September 2025, together accounting for 99.0% [18]. This concentration can provide a stable initial demand base, but it limits price discovery and makes the market vulnerable to common balance-sheet constraints. Viet Nam therefore cannot equate a successful primary placement with a functioning market; secondary liquidity, investor diversity and tradable benchmark lines are essential.

Table 3. Comparative BILI diagnosis of the United Kingdom and Viet Nam

| BILI pillar | Operational test | United Kingdom | Viet Nam |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benchmark (B) | Is there a repeatable sovereign or equivalent green reference curve? | 3 - repeated sovereign programme and multiple maturities. | 0 - no central sovereign green benchmark; market is private-sector driven. |
| Integrity (I_g) | Are eligibility, proceeds, reporting, review and claims enforceable? | 2 - strong framework and conduct rules, but outcome comparability remains incomplete. | 1 - legal classification base exists; implementation, assurance and data remain uneven. |
| Liquidity (L) | Can investors trade across maturities with diverse counterparties? | 3 - deep sovereign market and established intermediary ecosystem. | 1 - small stock, short average tenor and highly concentrated investor base. |
| Internationalisation (I_n) | Are standards and infrastructure connected to global capital and services? | 3 - London-based international market and professional-service network. | 1 - selective offshore access and partnerships; domestic internationalisation is nascent. |
| Weakest-link score Q_BILI | Minimum of the four pillar scores. | 2 | 0 |

*Source: authors' assessment based on the method in section 2 and evidence in [9-18]. Score: 0 = absent; 1 = initial; 2 = operational but incomplete; 3 = institutionalised.*

The comparative diagnosis in table 3 gives Viet Nam scores of 0 on Benchmark and 1 on each of the other three pillars, so Q_BILI = 0. The result does not imply institutional absence: the green classification decision and several private issues are substantive advances. It identifies the weakest market-building function - the lack of a central sovereign green benchmark - while also showing that sovereign issuance alone would be insufficient. Without rigorous project selection, annual post-issuance reporting, external assurance, longer local-currency maturities and broader investor participation, a sovereign label could create publicity without durable market infrastructure.

## 4. Discussion

### 4.1. Strategic design principles for Viet Nam

The policy objective should be to build a green capital-allocation system that supports double-digit growth without weakening macroeconomic stability or locking future generations into high-emission assets. The first principle is strategic additionality: eligible expenditure should address projects that are economically justified but constrained by long maturities, technology risk, climate externalities or incomplete markets. Priority pipelines should include power-grid modernisation and storage, renewable-energy integration, energy-efficient industry and buildings, urban public transport, water and wastewater systems, coastal and delta resilience, circular-economy infrastructure and nature-based adaptation. A green bond should not refinance routine expenditure merely because it can be classified as green; it should improve the timing, scale, transparency or risk allocation of investment.

The second principle is sovereign leadership with debt discipline. Viet Nam should prepare an inaugural sovereign green-bond programme inside the medium-term public-debt and annual borrowing strategy, not as an off-budget vehicle. The programme should publish an ex ante framework, a multi-year eligible-expenditure pipeline, exclusion and do-no-significant-harm rules, budget-tagging procedures, annual allocation and impact reports, and independent assurance. Two benchmark maturities followed by regular reopenings would be more valuable than a single bespoke issue because they would begin a local-currency green yield curve. Foreign-currency issuance should remain selective and matched to foreign-currency revenues or hedging capacity; any guarantees or blended-finance structures should be transparently recorded as contingent fiscal risks.

The third principle is targeted, temporary market support rather than permanent subsidy. First-time issuers may receive standard documentation, partial support for external-review costs and access to project-preparation facilities, because fixed transaction costs are especially burdensome for smaller firms [7; 8]. Credit enhancement should be used to allocate risk to the party best able to bear it, not to conceal weak projects. Tax incentives, if used, should be time-bound and evaluated against additional issuance and environmental outcomes. The policy target should not be a greenium by itself: financing costs ultimately reflect credit quality, liquidity, macroeconomic conditions and project economics, while a green label mainly reduces information frictions when integrity is credible [5; 14].

The fourth principle is enforceable integrity. Decision No. 21/2025/QD-TTg gives Viet Nam an advantage by providing a national classification reference [17], but the UK experience warns against treating a taxonomy as a self-executing solution. Viet Nam should connect classification to a register of eligible projects, accredited independent reviewers, standard impact metrics, post-issuance verification and proportionate sanctions for false or misleading claims. Regulators should distinguish use-of-proceeds compliance from issuer-wide transition claims and require explicit disclosure of refinancing shares, project baselines, methodologies, material trade-offs and any divergence from international standards.

### 4.2. Integrating the International Financial Centre in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang

The International Financial Centre creates an opportunity to turn green bonds from a specialised product into a strategic financial-service capability. Resolution No. 222/2025/QH15 [19] and Decree No. 323/2025/ND-CP [20] establish the national legal framework, while the UK-Viet Nam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership explicitly supports cooperation on international financial centres in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang, capital markets, fintech and green finance [21]. The two locations should not develop competing standards. They should operate under one national taxonomy interface, one disclosure architecture, interoperable settlement and data systems, consistent prudential and anti-money-laundering rules, and a common supervisory perimeter.

Within that unified architecture, a functional division of labour could raise efficiency. This is the authors' proposal, not a description of current statutory allocation. Ho Chi Minh City should specialise in wholesale issuance and listing, underwriting, asset management, international investor relations, custody, market making, green indices and risk-management services. Da Nang should specialise in fintech and regulatory sandboxes, digital monitoring-reporting-verification systems, climate-data assurance, project aggregation and the preparation of adaptation, clean-energy and resilient-infrastructure assets for the Central and coastal regions. The division would connect financial depth in Ho Chi Minh City with a technology- and project-oriented platform in Da Nang.

Three safeguards are necessary. First, the Centre must remain connected to the domestic VND market rather than becoming an offshore enclave whose products increase currency mismatch. Second, regulatory experimentation should not become regulatory arbitrage; identical environmental claims must meet identical integrity standards across both locations. Third, market infrastructure should be designed around data reuse. A project verified for national classification, budget tagging or JETP eligibility should not be required to reproduce inconsistent datasets for each exchange, regulator or investor. Shared digital identifiers and audit trails would reduce issuance costs while improving supervision.

### 4.3. UK-Viet Nam cooperation and a phased roadmap to 2045

Bilateral cooperation can accelerate capacity building without substituting for domestic institutional ownership. The 2025 Joint Declaration provides for an International Financial Centre partnership and a UK-Viet Nam Green Finance Partnership [21]. Practical cooperation should focus on sovereign-framework design, project preparation, external-review standards, impact-reporting templates, market-maker arrangements, local-currency structures and guarantees that crowd in private capital. UK expertise is most valuable when it lowers transaction and information costs for Vietnamese institutions, rather than when it merely channels Vietnamese issuers toward offshore borrowing.

The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) can complement this approach. Its political declaration seeks to mobilise at least USD 15.5 billion over three to five years, comprising USD 7.75 billion of public-sector finance and at least USD 7.75 billion of private finance, subject to project pipelines, terms and Viet Nam's public- and external-debt framework [22]. JETP resources are therefore not equivalent to grants and should not be treated as a substitute for domestic capital-market development. Their highest strategic value is catalytic: technical assistance, concessional tranches and guarantees can improve project bankability and support VND-denominated or naturally hedged green-bond structures.

Table 4. Proposed roadmap for Viet Nam's green-bond market, 2026-2045

| Phase | Core measures | Role of the International Financial Centre | Risk gates and expected outputs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-2027: foundation and pilots | Issue technical guidance; establish project and reviewer registries; standardise data and impact metrics; publish a sovereign framework; pilot two benchmark maturities. | Create common HCMC-Da Nang disclosure, data and supervisory architecture; test issuance and digital MRV services. | Debt-strategy integration, project readiness, baseline data, independent review and no double counting. |
| 2028-2030: scale with integrity | Regularly reopen sovereign lines; prioritise VND tenor extension; support first-time issuers; develop market makers, guarantees, a green index and broader investors. | HCMC leads wholesale issuance, asset management and market making; Da Nang leads fintech, climate data and project aggregation. | Annual allocation and impact reports; higher turnover, longer tenor, more issuers and investors, controlled FX exposure. |
| 2031-2045: deepening and transition finance | Apply sector pathways to transition bonds; expand climate-risk insurance, hedging and cross-border funds; link finance to verified outcomes. | Operate as an internationally connected but nationally unified green and transition-finance platform. | No carbon lock-in; transparent contingent liabilities; measurable resilience and emissions-intensity gains; international interoperability. |

*Source: proposed by the authors on the basis of the BILI framework.*

The roadmap in table 4 aligns market development with national milestones. During 2026-2027, the priority is credibility: operational guidance, project and reviewer registries, baseline data, a sovereign framework and limited pilots. During 2028-2030, the priority is scale with integrity: repeated benchmark issuance, longer VND maturities, market makers, a green index, broader institutional participation and coordinated IFC segments. This phase should directly support the 2030 targets for rapid growth, higher productivity, modern industry and green transition [1], while preserving inflation, debt and external-balance discipline.

From 2031 to 2045, the market should expand from clearly green assets toward credible transition finance for hard-to-abate industry, logistics and energy security. Eligibility should be based on sectoral pathways, time-bound performance targets and verifiable reductions, not on indefinite financing of marginal improvements. By 2045, success should be measured less by the volume of labelled bonds than by lower emissions intensity, stronger climate resilience, deeper local-currency capital markets, internationally competitive financial services and the contribution of finance to Viet Nam's developed, high-income objective [1].

**5. Conclusion**

This study has re-examined the UK's green-bond experience from the perspective of Viet Nam's strategic development needs. Its main finding is that market success results from institutional sequencing and state-market complementarity, not from a green label or issuance volume alone. The UK combined long-term strategy, a sovereign benchmark, transparent allocation, market-conduct rules and global financial-centre capabilities. Its decision not to proceed with a national taxonomy further shows that classification must be proportionate, interoperable and connected to real investment decisions.

The article's original BILI framework identifies the minimum condition that constrains market quality. The UK is mature in Benchmark, Liquidity and Internationalisation but still faces an Integrity challenge in translating procedural alignment into comparable outcomes. Viet Nam has made important legal progress, yet its market remains small, short-dated, partly foreign-currency denominated and entirely private-sector driven. The absence of a sovereign green benchmark is the immediate weakest link, but it must be repaired in parallel with verification, reporting, data and secondary-market capacity.

For Viet Nam, the strategic recommendation is a phased sovereign programme integrated with public-debt management; enforceable bond-level and issuer-level integrity; longer-tenor VND instruments; targeted project preparation and credit enhancement; and a unified green-finance architecture for the International Financial Centre in Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang. UK-Viet Nam cooperation and JETP resources should be used to transfer capability, improve bankability and mobilise private capital while protecting strategic autonomy and macro-financial stability.

These measures would make green bonds a practical instrument for the 2026-2030 double-digit growth ambition and the 2030 and 2045 national goals, rather than a narrow ESG product. The study is limited by its reliance on secondary data and institutional comparison. Transaction-level research on pricing, liquidity, impact performance and investor behaviour should be the next step for testing the BILI framework and calibrating quantitative policy targets.

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